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Introduction 
Cuba is in the process of undergoing significant – perhaps fundamen-
tal – economic reforms. Although the pace is not always very fast, and 
the direction is more characterized by zigzagging that by a straight 
line, there is little doubt that the state-dominated economy is about to 
give way to more non-state actors. In theory and ideology, the official 
line confirmed at the 2011 Party Congress is still that “plan” and not 
“market” is the guiding principle. But in practice, plans drawn up by 
the state bureaucracy play a rapidly diminishing role in the “really ex-
isting economy.” State bureaucrats, however, seem to be practicing 
considerable “civil disobedience” by dragging their feet in the imple-
mentation of reforms approved by the party leadership, as Raúl Castro 
himself has repeatedly complained about.  
 
So far, the discussion of reforms in Cuba has almost exclusively fo-
cused on economic aspects. The VI Party Congress in April 2011 was 
exclusively dedicated to economic reform, or “updating [actualiza-
ción] of the economic model,” which is the politically correct but not 
very adequate expression. The Party Congress, and the comprehensive 
debate within Cuban society leading up to it, led to quite significantly 
rising expectations about economic prospects in Cuba, both for the 
country as a whole and for individuals and families, although the con-
fidence in the present leadership’s capacity to solve Cuba’s deep prob-
lems seems to be rapidly falling again.1   
 
The Party Conference (not Congress) in January 2012 was supposed 
to discuss political aspects of the reform process, particularly the role 
of the Communist Party. This Conference hardly brought any signifi-
cant new proposals; it rather confirmed the status quo. As such, it was 
considered by most of the reform-oriented in Cuba as a deep decep-
tion. The emphasis in party leader Raúl Castro’s keynote speech was 
on confirming the non-debatable monopoly of the Communist Party. 
So, officially speaking, there is no real political reform process un-
derway in Cuba in the midst of economic reforms. 
 
Still, there is no doubt that economic reforms underway will have a 
deep impact on the political fabric of Cuban society. This paper in-
tends to discuss in which political direction the ongoing reform pro-
cess may be taking the country. We propose to focus on the potential 
                                                 
1  According to a survey carried out by Freedom House (2011): Change Comes to Cuba: 
Citizens Views on Reform after the Sixth Party Congress. 
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economic-political dynamism and the emergence of institutional re-
form, with relevance for key change areas: structurally by studying 
the emergence of a non-state sector with emphasis on the agricultural 
reform and self-employment (cuentapropismo), with possible further 
development into, small and medium enterprise (SMEs) and the space 
for entrepreneurship. In parallel, there will be an attempt to study 
which impact reforms in these areas may have on the behavior of po-
tentially crucial actors of change: emerging entrepreneurs, people 
connected to churches and other civil society expressions, academics, 
artists, information workers, and of course the new generation of lead-
ers (particularly within the Communist Party and the Armed Forces, in 
the latter case not least the emerging military enterprise sector).  
 
This article is part of a research project with the objective of making 
an on-going assessment of the dynamics between economic and polit-
ical transformations in Cuba by comparing these to theoretical and 
empirical literature on other transition experiences: democratic transi-
tions in Latin America as well as Southern and Eastern Europe, the 
on-going struggle between democratic and authoritarian trends in the 
former USSR (and even some newly democratized Eastern European 
countries), and the authoritarian market transition taking place in Chi-
na and Vietnam.   
 
The general hypothesis is that the economic reforms in Cuba are slow-
ly moving the country from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian society 
(referring to a typology developed by Linz & Stepan2), with potential 
for the emergence of an increasing although limited democratic space, 
but alternatively for the emergence of a post-Castro authoritarian po-
litical-economic elite not least linked to the Armed Forces. Three al-
ternative scenarios are developed to reflect these options. It is believed 
that the study of two transition processes (agricultural reform and the 
emerging entrepreneurship), understood within Cuba’s international 
context and with an additional view to the impact of a future oil econ-
omy, will offer a good indication as to which of these three scenarios 
will have more prominence in Cuba’s political development. 
   
 
                                                 
2  Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-
tion: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
From Democratization to Democratic 
Backlash 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a general trend of democratic transition took 
place in two regions of very special relevance for Cuba: Latin Ameri-
ca and the ex-USSR and many of its former allies in Eastern Europe. 
This is what Samuel Huntington referred to as “the third wave of de-
mocratization.”3 Very soon, it was easy to see that many of the coun-
tries which had been going through these democratic transitions start-
ed experiencing a significant slide back to more authoritarian political 
structures.  
 
Two of the very few countries which claimed to remain socialist made 
remarkable transitions to market economy without ever loosening up 
the political monopoly of the communist parties: China and Vietnam. 
These processes are core references as Cuba sets out on a journey to 
look for a new economic and political identity.  
 
Starting with the perhaps the most obvious example, the leading coun-
try in the previous USSR, there seems to be an increasing perception 
in the Russian population that authoritarianism is on the offensive dur-
ing Vladimir Putin’s regime.4 But many observers doubt the sustaina-
bility of this new authoritarianism: 
 
The policies of President Vladimir Putin have undermined Russia’s fledging 
democratic institutions but have also failed to generate any sort of coherent au-
thoritarianism to take their place. Thus, fifteen years after the collapse of the 
USSR, the country still lacks any consensus about its basic principles of state le-
gitimacy. To explain this, we must understand the ways in which the Soviet Un-
ion’s institutional legacies have short-circuited all three historically effective 
types of legitimate rule—traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic— resulting 
in a highly corrupt state that still cannot fully control its borders, monopolize the 
legal means of violence, or clearly articulate its role in the contemporary world.5 
 
An interesting element of this analysis, when looking ahead at a post-
Castro Cuba, is the problem of upholding authoritarian legitimacy 
                                                 
3  Samuel P. Huntington (1991):  The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century. Harvard University Press. 
4  With Putin serving either as President (1999-2008) or Prime Minister (2008-2012). most 
observers agree it is he who has been calling the shots even during Medvedev’s presiden-
cy (2008 – 2012). And from 2012, of course, he is back in the position as President, based 
on an electoral landslide – although the numbers may have been somewhat inflated – of 
almost two-thirds majority.  
5  Stephen E. Hanson (2007): “The Uncertain Future of Russia's Weak State Authoritarian-
ism,” East European Politics & Societies, February 2007, vol. 21, no. 1, 67-81. 
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when there is no charismatic source to draw on (although Putin may 
have tried – and with a certain success – to build that in Russia, ap-
pealing to nationalism). Hanson’s quoted article (from 2007) also 
points out how much legitimacy in such a situation will depend on a 
relative economic success, and that leadership transition along with 
economic failure and increasing socio-economic inequalities may pro-
voke more widespread and sustained public protest, as seemed to be 
happening in Russia in the lead-up to Putin’s return to the Presidency 
in 2012.  
 
In the European former Soviet-bloc countries going through a recent 
democratization, similar trends seem to be prominent, particularly in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. We may speak about a new 
wave of “democratic pessimism.” A survey by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)6 shows that a positive atti-
tude towards both democracy and market economy have fallen in 
2011 relative to 2006 in all EU “transition countries” except for Bul-
garia. In 11 transition countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasuses and 
Central Asia, 50% or fewer express a clear preference for democracy 
after having had a certain taste of it. What is happening in Hungary 
under the rightist and nationalist Orban regime is provoking particular 
worry. But even the not-so-new South European democracies (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain) are seen by many to be endangered by the financial 
crisis.  
 
An expression of this “democratic pessimism” was the Report pre-
sented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 
June 2012 by Andreas Gross.7 Some of the statements are remarkably 
pessimistic, like the following summary: “After the outbreak of the 
global financial and economic crisis, many European democracies 
turned out to be powerless in the face of market forces, and thus suf-
fered further loss of credibility on the part of their citizens. People in 
several European States lost a great part of their “popular sovereignty” 
– the only source of legitimate political power” (p. 5).  One of the con-
tradictions he points out is the appearance of “market forces without 
any kind of political containment,” leading people to look – so far in 
vain – for a new balance, with the consequent loss of the basic as-
sumption that capitalism needs to be subject to extensive political con-
trol in order to be compatible with democracy (p. 9).  
 
Of relevance to a country like Cuba, where democratic reforms are 
eagerly encouraged by European states, it is worthwhile noting Gross’ 
statement – hardly questioned by anybody – about the paradox of to-
                                                 
6  EBRD (2011): Life in Transition after the Crisis. 
7  Andreas Gross, Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, Council of Europe, Par-
liamentary Assembly (2012): “The crisis of democracy and the role of the State in today’s 
Europe,” Doc. 12955, 11 June 2012, http://assembly.coe.int. 
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day’s democracies: “although never before have so many people lived 
in democracies, never before have so many people been disappointed 
with the quality of the democracy they live in and experience on a dai-
ly basis” (p. 6).  And it is of particular relevance when we discuss the 
democratic prospects in Cuba when he goes on to find a number of 
central and eastern European countries with “some worrying signs of 
‘democratic fatigue’ (…) 20 years after the fall of their former re-
gimes” (p. 7).  Although there are no doubts about the need for de-
mocracy as the way of organizing public affairs for the people’s great-
est benefit, “hardly anybody challenges the hypothesis that democracy 
is in crisis today,” and that in “their actual day-to-day existence to-
day’s democracies find it very difficult to deliver what most people 
expect from them” (p. 10). 
 
 
Some Lessons from Authoritarian 
Market Transition in Vietnam 
The Vietnam transition process is probably the closest we may come 
to a “role model” for how the present Cuban leadership is thinking. 
When Raúl Castro visited Vietnam in July 2012, following up on Sec-
retary General Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to Havana in April, there 
was a very clear difference in the way relations with this country were 
portrayed in official declarations compared to the two other stop-overs 
on the same journey: Beijing and Moscow. This relationship is one of 
“brotherhood,” “solidarity,” rather than “partnership” and “mutual 
benefits,” although the size of trade and investments is lower. This is a 
strong political alliance, while the Chinese are very keen to stick to 
the pragmatic character of the relations. The Cuban delegation 
stressed that it will study the current modeling of economic develop-
ment in Vietnam, referring to the Doi Moi,8 the Vietnamese “big 
bang,” as some have called this fundamental economic reform process 
initiated at the 1986 CP Congress.  
 
De Vylder and Fforde (1996) interpret the political process behind Doi 
Moi as an adaptation by the Communist Party to the changing political 
structures beneath it: (a) the rising state business interests (of a rapidly 
commercialized state sector), i.e. with the military playing an im-
portant role in food production; and (b) the fear of massive urban un-
employment as non-viable state enterprises had to close, and the po-
tential for social tension and disorder.9 
 
Both these factors may be said to be present in Cuba. Regarding the 
second factor, it is interesting to note that massive lay-offs of state 
workers after the Doi Moi were largely compensated by mushrooming 
employment opportunities in the non-state sector, generally offering 
better conditions than in the companies they left. But there are two 
important factors that distinguish Cuba from Vietnam here: (a) the 
high percentage of rural and agricultural population in Vietnam may 
have eased the process, by strengthening access to land and markets 
for the peasants; and (b) the strong and relatively unfettered stimulus 
in Vietnam to establish private companies,10 leading to a rapid surge 
                                                 
8  Doi Moi =”renovation.” 
9  Stefan de Vylder, Adam Fforde (1996): From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition 
in Vietnam. Westview Press. 
10  There are no more boundaries for private investments in Vietnam. The latest revision of 
the Enterprise Law (2005) in principle treats all investments in the same way: state-owned 
enterprise, foreign direct investment and nationally owned private enterprise. Many pri-
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in private savings and investments, and a strong encouragement of the 
entrepreneurial spirit, which as we shall see is not yet seen in Cuba.  
 
The limits to political reform in Vietnam are quite similar to the ones 
seen in Cuba: very limited freedom of expression (with no independ-
ent media), limited freedom to travel (a restriction now being gradual-
ly lifted in Cuba), a significant process of releasing political prisoners, 
limited access to foreign sources of information, and limited freedom 
of organization and association (although an important difference is 
that the Catholic Church and other religious communities seem to en-
joy more freedom in Cuba). What the two countries have in common 
is the absence of organized extra-party opposition, with the existence 
of a small and relatively insignificant dissenter groups. Some students 
of Vietnam claim, though, that what is termed a “political civil socie-
ty”11 developed to some degree around the 2006 APEC Summit in Vi-
etnam with some capacity to really challenge the position of the 
Communist Party; it now seems to have been effectively neutralized.  
 
A deeper political interpretation of the Vietnamese transition is pre-
sented by Martin Gainsborough (2010). Against the backdrop of Doi 
Moi, he explores how these reforms in the economic arena are 
matched by remarkably persistent, but yet re-structuring, political 
power structures. He finds three key changes during the years he stud-
ied (1996-2007): changes affecting state enterprises, growing capital 
markets, and, last but not least, signs of a widening of the political 
space and a more vibrant civil society. But, he goes on to say, certain 
things do not change very fast, and power continuously seeks to re-
create itself. The abolishment of one-party rule does not at all seem to 
be on the agenda.12  
 
In addition to a more robust civil society, Gainsborough also focuses 
on what is taking place within the state. And this is probably very rel-
evant when studying the Cuban case: the reform drive does not come 
from independent interests made up by social classes, but from an in-
tra-elite conflict within the state apparatus. The traditional arguments 
that the emergence of strong middle classes is decisive in producing a 
vital pro-democratic force, seem to have little relevance both in Vi-
etnam and Cuba, since these classes are so dependent on the state. In 
Vietnam, according to Gainsborough, the various state institutions are 
strengthened as political actors, the National Assembly is strength-
                                                 
vate entrepreneurs have joined the CP (just like in China). Several party officials have 
their own enterprises. 
11  Carlyle A. Thayer (2009): “Vietnam and the Challenge of Political Civil Society,” Con-
temporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, April 2009, 
Volume 31, No. 1, pp. 1-27. 
12  Martin Gainsborough (2010): Vietnam: Rethinking the State. Zed Books.  
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ened, and the concerns of the business sector are also channeled 
through state-sanctioned (and not independent) institutions. 
 
Important in the latter category is the way the private economic sector 
is organized: through a semi-governmental organization called the Vi-
etnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) (where state-
owned enterprises also participate), rather than through independent 
employer organizations. The VCCI is not under the direct control of 
the Communist Party, but Party committees must be established in all 
private enterprises. 
 
Another important aspect of the Vietnam case is the constant blurring 
between the public and the private, and the use of public office for 
private gain. The way “corporate actors” buy influence with “state ac-
tors,” forming patronage networks, seems to be fundamental to under-
stand how the country’s political system works. Vietnam in this sense 
seems to represent the almost perfect rejection of Weberian ideals. To 
a large extent, this is a blueprint for the massive corruption occurring 
in Vietnam. We may almost speak about a peculiar form of patrimoni-
al state, with the ruler in the form of the ruling party controlling politi-
cal and economic life where personal relationship to the party decides 
who has access both to the economic and political elite and is the 
source of amassing personal wealth.  
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party’s decision in 2006 to remove the 
clause that party members “could not exploit,” i.e., that they were al-
lowed to run private business and hire workers and practice capital 
accumulation, was seen as crossing a vital ideological line which, at 
least officially, has not yet been crossed in Cuba. But it was probably 
little more than bringing the party in line with a well-established prac-
tice, which also is increasingly present in Cuba.  
 
This seems to be the underlying logic to Vietnam’s political system. 
According to Gainsborough, we may talk about a transition from a 
“socialist state” to a “capitalist state,” where the concept of “reform” 
takes on a new meaning, and where the basic idea of “state retreat” is 
questioned.
A Comparative Framework for the  
Understanding of “Transformations”  
One of the most interesting and perhaps representative attempts to 
measure the progress of economic and political transformation around 
the world is the so-called Bertelmann Stiftung´s Transformation Index 
(BTI), which analyses and evaluates the quality of democracy, market 
economy and political management in 128 developing and transition 
countries.13 The index contains 18 assessment areas divided into three 
main categories: political transformation, economic transformation 
and transformation management. It is therefore a much more inclusive 
index than others that, e.g., only measure classical freedoms and ex-
clude other important development issues (like the Freedom House 
index), or only focus on social and economic issues (e.g., the Human 
Development Index, in which Cuba ranks 51 of 187 countries in the 
2011 ranking).   
 
Figure 1 shows how unevenly Cuba performs on the different indica-
tors. On Political Transformation, Cuba has almost a top score on 
“stateness,” but almost bottom on “political participation” and “stabil-
ity of democratic institutions,” and very low also on “rule of law.” On 
Economic Transformation, Cuba has relatively high scores on “wel-
fare regime,” “sustainability” and “level of socioeconomic develop-
ment,” very low on “organization of market and competition” and 
“private property.” Regarding management performance, it is particu-
larly low on consensus-building and steering capability.  
                                                 
13  Bertelmann Stiftung (2012): “Democracy Not Advancing Around the Globe”: 
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-F58DDEA7-
FFF3F259/bst_engl/hs.xsl/307.htm. 
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Figure 1: 
BTI 2012 | Cuba Country Performance14 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows the 2012 BTI for Cuba relative to the top two perform-
ers (Czech Republic and Taiwan), the top Latin American performer 
Uruguay (Chile and Costa Rica are also among the top ten perform-
ers), and some interesting reference countries for Cuba: Russia, Ango-
la, China, Vietnam and North Korea. 
 
 
                                                 
14 http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/lac/cuba. 
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Table 1: Transformation Index BTI 2012 - Status Index15 
 
Status Index Political Transformation Economic Transformation 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
 
▲ 
1 9,61 Czech Republic 2 9,65 10,0 10,0 9,3 10,0 9,0 1 9,57 10,0 10,0 9,5 10,0 9,5 9,0 9,0 
2 9,54 Taiwan 2 9,65 10,0 10,0 10,0 9,5 8,8 2 9,43 10,0 9,5 10,0 9,5 9,0 9,0 9,0 
4 9,30 Uruguay 1 9,95 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 9,8 10 8,64 8,0 8,5 9,0 9,5 9,0 9,0 7,5 
60 5,73 Russia 71 5,35 7,8 5,3 4,3 5,5 4,0 52 6,11 6,0 6,3 9,0 4,5 5,5 7,0 4,5 
83 4,97 Angola 78 4,98 8,0 5,3 3,5 3,5 4,7 82 4,96 3,0 4,3 7,0 4,5 5,0 7,0 4,0 
84 4,94 China 113 3,32 8,8 1,8 2,3 1,5 2,3 38 6,57 5,0 6,5 7,0 6,0 5,0 10,0 6,5 
86 4,84 Vietnam 109 3,50 9,3 2,3 2,5 1,5 2,0 50 6,18 5,0 5,3 7,0 5,0 6,0 9,0 6,0 
106 4,05 Cuba 112 3,42 9,5 1,5 2,8 1,0 2,3 89 4,68 6,0 1,8 4,5 2,0 7,0 5,0 6,5 
    125 7,78 North Korea 125 2,60 9,0 1,0 1,0 10 1,0 127 1,39 2,0 1,3 1,0 1,0 1,5 1,0 2,0 
                                                 
15 http://www.bti-project.org//index/status-index/. 
 
Cuba has an overall ranking of 106 among the 128 countries included 
in the BTI (the lowest in the western hemisphere with the exception of 
Haiti), with a sub-ranking of 112 in political transition and 89 in eco-
nomic transition.  It is particularly interesting to compare these scores 
to those of China and Vietnam (ranking overall as 84 and 86, respec-
tively). 
  
 All three countries have almost the same score and rating on 
the various aspects of Political Transformation, where the only 
noteworthy difference is that Vietnam has a slightly higher 
score (but still relatively low) on “political participation.” 
 On Economic Transformation, however, China and Vietnam 
score markedly higher, particularly in terms of “economic per-
formance” (where they are on the top), “organisation of the 
market and competition,” “private property” and “currency and 
price stability.” These are of course the areas where the Cuban 
reforms need to approach China’s and Vietnam’s in order to 
become effective. Judging from the cases of China and Vi-
etnam on the BTI, however, there is no reason to believe that 
more success in economic transformation will lead to signifi-
cant progress in political transformation. 
Also of importance for Cuba, the latest BTI refutes the myth of the 
“Asian model,” according to which autocracies can have overall eco-
nomic development that is more stable, reliable and robust than func-
tioning democratic systems. According to the BTI,  
 
A comparison of autocracies and democracies, however, reveals that the latter 
score better in all areas, on average. Even China and Vietnam are far from the 
level of the top democratic performers. The ‘transformation leader’ at the top of 
the BTI´s Management Index over the most recent period is, for instance, Tai-
wan. Achieving the highest possible score in 13 out of 18 assessment areas, the 
island nation contrasts markedly with the authoritarian development model being 
applied on the Chinese mainland (ibid, p. 2).  
 
When judging the general trends of democratic transformation after 
many years of general progress (recall Huntington’s concept of “the 
third wave of democratization”), BTI now comes to similarly pessi-
mistic conclusions as the above-quoted reports. The 2012 Index shows 
that the quality of democracy in two important reference regions for 
Cuba – Eastern Europe and Latin America – has worsened considera-
bly. This is particularly the case regarding political rights and freedom 
of expression, where Eastern Europe and Latin America are consid-
ered relatively “the most advanced regions” of the democratic trans-
formation countries (in practice mostly non-OECD countries). Fifteen 
of 38 states in these two regions exhibit a decline in the quality of 
democratic elections, and there are increasing restrictions on inde-
pendent media. 
Trends in Cuba’s Economic-Political 
Evolution 
Agricultural Policies 
The opening up of agriculture to more private initiative has been seen 
as crucial, for several reasons. First, there is an acute shortage of food 
products in a country with vast potential for agricultural self-
sufficiency and export, making food imports one of the heaviest bur-
dens on the economy (1,800 million USD in 2011). As much as 70-
80% of food products are being imported, and paradoxically the U.S. 
has become the most important food provider. This situation is simply 
unsustainable. 
 
And second, there is an almost unanimous consensus that peasants and 
farmers will be far more efficient producers if they get more autono-
my and better access to the means of production and to the market.  
The needed structural changes in agriculture include property or user 
rights, access to production implements and credit, transport, and, not 
least, freedom to sell the products on an open market – wholesale or 
directly to consumers. Even the possibility to enter into industrial pro-
cessing of food products would give the peasants an important extra 
incentive. We are therefore speaking about a dramatic shift from state 
control to market conditions, a shift that will also unavoidably have 
repercussions on the general balance between plan and market in the 
economy. We can also assume that such shift will also be politically 
very important. 
 
There is no doubt that a very significant shift towards more non-state 
production has taken place over the last years. Adding together private 
property and cooperatives where land is worked individually (the so-
called credit and service cooperatives – CCSs), their share of land 
holdings almost doubled from 18.5% to 35.3% between 2007 and 
2010-2011. This change is partly explained by fall in the share of state 
holdings (state farms, from 35.8% to 26%) and the conversion of the 
so-called UBPCs (where land in reality is held and worked collective-
ly, but formally not state-owned) to CCSs (UBPC’s share fell from 
approximately 37% to 30%).16  
                                                 
16 | Armando Nova González (2012): “La propiedad en la economía cubana,” Chapter 4 in: 
Pérez/Torres (eds): Hacia una estrategia de desarrollo para los inicios del siglo XXI, Ta-
ble 4.1., p. 136. A survey of the remaining UBPCs in 2012 concluding that only 25% of 
them were efficient, led to a decision to close many of them down and to condone or re-
negotiate their debt, but at the same time stop subsidizing them, and to give them more 
management autonomy (Diario de las Américas, Miami, 15.09.12. 
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What is particularly striking here is that CCSs and private property, at 
a time when they represented 24.4% of land holdings, produced 57% 
of food in the country.17  
 
Some important steps have been taken towards more autonomy for 
agricultural producers. But the evolution of policies has not been very 
clear. In the cited paper by Nova, he establishes the following five cri-
teria for a more independent and effective farmer: 
 
1. The establishment of a market for production goods and im-
plements. There are some positive elements in this respect in 
the Guidelines (Lineamientos) approved by the VI Party Con-
ference, but very little has been implemented. 
 
2. That the producer can decide – according to the market and 
social requirements – what to produce and where and to whom 
to sell. On this point, the draft Guidelines had a very interest-
ing proposal of allowing cooperatives to sell independently of 
state intermediation, but it was substantially changed in the fi-
nally approved Guidelines: free sale is only permitted after ful-
filling state quotas, and non-state intermediation is not permit-
ted.  
 
3. Diversification of market channels; abolishment of state mo-
nopoly. Again, there are interesting reform proposals in the 
Guidelines, hinting at the abolishment of state monopoly of the 
wholesale market, but also in this case implementation is so far 
missing.18  
 
4. Free hiring of necessary labor force. This is now partly per-
mitted. 
 
5. Access to credit and technical assistance: Limited credit 
schemes for private producers have been opened, but so far on-
ly in non-convertible currency. 
Cuba is still far away from meeting these market conditions in agricul-
ture, and the latest statistical information confirms that the modest ag-
ricultural reforms have failed to boost production. It must be very dis-
appointing for the government to see that the country actually was 
producing less food in 2011 than in 2007 (in spite of a significant in-
crease in the production of two staple products: rice and beans), while 
                                                 
17  Ibid. 
18  Hints about such plans appear every now and then (e.g., in Vice President Marino Muril-
lo’s speech to Parliament in the July session).  
The Dynamics of National Innovation Systems    21 
 
21 
food prices rose by as much a 20% in 2011.19 This is in stark contrast 
to China and Vietnam, where far more consistent market reforms in 
agriculture have led to impressive production success. 
 
The most important increase in non-state agricultural holdings takes 
place through lease-arrangements, the so-called usufruto, of state or 
semi-state land lying idle. Since this was legalized through a Decreto-
Ley passed in 2008, one million hectares of land have been distributed 
among 170,000 producers in this way. Until October 2012, conditions 
imposed on those who gained access to land through this mechanism 
probably explain why this measure has had so limited impact on pro-
duction output (in addition to the general weaknesses mentioned 
above):  the duration of the leasing contracts (limited to ten years), the 
lack of access to pass the lease from one generation to the next, and 
the prohibition on building houses on the property. New rules which 
will go into effect at the end of December partly meet the criticism by 
going a considerable way to follow the example of China and to stim-
ulate this form of land tenure: private farmers will now be allowed to 
lease up to 67 hectares (up from 40), they will be allowed to build 
homes on the land, and lease rights may now be passed on from 
farmer to heir.  Another complaint, about the limited length of the 
lease (only 10 years opposed to 50 years in Vietnam and China) has 
not been met, but leases may be renewed.  
 
While decisive steps still remain to be taken in what Nova calls the 
production-distribution-consumption cycle in agriculture, things are 
happening “in the informal Cuban reality” which is fast outdistancing 
legality. Production goods and implements are being sold and bought 
on the black market; food products are being increasingly sold outside 
of official state and other legal channels, e.g., to hotels and restaurants 
(not least to private paladares); although the state maintains interme-
diation monopoly (through centros de acopio), private wholesale mar-
kets have emerged around major urban areas;20 it is common to see 
considerable numbers of workers harvesting private property crops; 
credit in convertible currency is being frequently obtained by private 
producers farming in much larger scale than one could expect from 
formal regulation. Although capital accumulation is formally illegal 
(explicitly ruled out in a speech by Raúl Castro at the Party Congress), 
there is no doubt that many successful private farmers have managed 
to accumulate considerable amounts of cash – even in convertible cur-
rency.  
 
                                                 
19  Reuters quoting a report from Cuba’s National Statistics Office, published in ASCE Cu-
ban Economic News Clippings Service, Release No 538, 13.09.12, p. 15. 
20  People speak about dozens or even hundreds of lorries of food products being sold to 
small-scale vendors in Rancho Boyeros, outside of Havana, every morning. 
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But foot-dragging is dominating the official response, stopping peas-
ants and farmers from really leaping wholeheartedly into a qualitative-
ly different production mode. It is difficult to see any other reason for 
this political hesitance than a worry about the emergence of a too au-
tonomous individual peasantry. 
 
One of the controversial issues about agriculture and cooperative poli-
cies is about access to so-called cooperatives of second degree, which 
would increase the economic and political strength and thereby also 
the potential political autonomy of the members. That has so far not 
been allowed. Generally, the Government seems to be very reluctant 
to allow more independent and autonomous forms of organization 
among peasants and farmers, still depending on a very centralized and 
strongly Party-loyal ANAP (National Association of Small Farmers). 
Talking to peasants and farmers across the country, it is not difficult to 
perceive an increasing impatience with the lack of a real interest group 
advocacy vis-à-vis State and Party. As expressed by Pedro Antonio 
Alonso Pérez, one of the founders of a self-proclaimed independent 
CCP cooperative named Transición in Santiago province in 1997 and 
head of a small study center: “It is obvious that ANAP neither repre-
sents nor defends the interests of the Cuban (agricultural) producers. 
Its purposes and objectives are to represent the interests of the com-
munist party and the government in power.”21 There is reason to be-
lieve that this opinion is pretty general among Cuban agriculturalists.    
 
A question raised by the left-wing critic of Cuba’s government, Sam-
uel Farber, in 2006 seems to be more relevant than ever: 
 
May we see agriculture as a strategic and more small-scale/democratic entrepre-
neurial alternative to the military entrepreneurship – unless the military also 
moves in to take control there? The question is whether the survival issue of en-
hanced food production will oblige the opening up of family agriculture with as-
sociated entrepreneurial functions.22 
Economic-Political Space for Small Entrepreneurs and SMEs 
The same hesitation described above regarding the opening for non-
state agricultural producers, can be seen when it comes to small entre-
preneurs and small-medium enterprise. There is also a similar over-
whelming demand for dramatic change: the state sector simply cannot 
                                                 
21  Quote from interview published in ASCE Cuban Economic News Clippings Service, Re-
lease No 526, 6.01.12, p. 22. It is interesting to note that the ANAP President dur-
ing 25 years, Orlando Lugo Fonte, who was at the same time member of the Consejo de 
Estado and the Central Committee of the PCC, was relieved of this function in September 
2012. It remains to be seen whether the new ANAP President, Félix González Viego, pre-
viously provincial ANAP President in Villa Clara, represents any renovation of the organ-
ization.  
22  Farber (2006): ”Cuba’s likely transition and its politics,” International Socialist Review, 
July–August 2006, Issue 48. 
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afford to keep its present workforce, productivity is dismal, Cuba has 
a tremendous fiscal crisis, and alternative employment is very difficult 
to find. When the official labor reduction campaign was launched in 
late 2010, the expressed objective was to lay off half a million em-
ployees during a few months.23 A projection by the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Prices estimates that the number of persons employed in the 
non-state sector will increase to 1.8 million in 2015, which would rep-
resent 35% of total employment, with a contribution of 44.5% to the 
nations GDP.24  In internal party meetings, top-level Ministry of Labor 
officials claimed that as much as 2,5 million state employees were in 
reality redundant.25  
________________________________________________________ 
The official plan was to offer those to be laid off to go into self-
employment (cuentapropistas) or to get land leased and start agricul-
tural production. It was hard to believe that a significant share of 
mostly urban and relatively well-educated dwellers would be willing 
to move back to the countryside. As far as urban self-employment is 
concerned there were many restrictions, both in terms of what services 
were legal (productive activities were only exceptionally legal), heavy 
and normally flat tax burdens, no wholesale market to buy raw materi-
als and implements, red tape, corruption etc. There seems to be an 
endless innovation of measures to make life difficult for people who 
try to establish businesses, e.g., levying stiff tariffs in mid-2012 on 
imported goods brought into the country by people travelling from 
Miami or Panama (mulas) exactly for that purpose. The self-
employed, e.g. those who run paladares, argue that this is often the 
only supply source in the absence of wholesale markets.   
 
The basic problem for productive employment generation is clearly 
that it is politically unacceptable to let private entrepreneurs develop 
their businesses in a profitable way. We are again up against the pro-
hibition on “capital accumulation.” Actually, the concept “small and 
medium enterprise” (PyME are the acronyms in Spanish) does not yet 
exist in official Cuban vocabulary. The large majority of legalized 
businesses, be it sidewalk cafeterias, carpentry, plumbing and other 
crafts, minor repair, etc., can hardly employ more than one or very 
few people. The legal maximum number of employees that can be 
hired is five. In reality, most of the cuentapropismo is little more than 
a survival strategy, comparable to the immense informal sector in 
                                                 
23  Ironically, the plan was for the first time officially announced by the workers’ and em-
ployees’ own and only trade union, CTC, through a statement (completely supporting the 
measure) in Party organ Granma (September 13, 2010). 
24  Intervention by Minister Lina Pedraza in Asamblea del Poder Popular, Havana, 15.12.10, 
further elaborated in: García A, B. Anaya y C. Piñeiro “Reestructuración del empleo en 
Cuba: el papel de las empresas no estatales en la generación de empleo y en la productivi-
dad del trabajo,” Seminario CEEC, June, 2011. 
25  Information privately obtained from a party member listening to an internal lecture on the 
subject 
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most third world countries (but with the difference that this is now 
mostly formalized in Cuba). These small businesses are really chang-
ing the street life in Cuban cities. And there are businesses that do 
employ a certain number of people – cases of up to 40 employees 
have been cited. Private restaurants (paladares) now have a limit of 50 
chairs, which of course means that a considerable workforce is re-
quired.  Private “bed & breakfast” facilities (casas particulares), 
which tend to offer a certain range of services to tourists, and public 
transportation with private vehicles, are other examples.26 There is al-
so a new policy of leasing out publicly-owned businesses like taxi 
services, hairdressing shops, bakeries and small cafeterias to the em-
ployees, who then are left to run these businesses as their own.   
 
It is quite conspicuous that cuentapropismo is not allowed among aca-
demic professions. In this way, Cuba is blocking its highly educated 
population, its brain capital, from seeking more decent income oppor-
tunities than what they are presently offered by the State. The only 
partial exception may be a small mostly informal private market in the 
education sector. But professionals such as lawyers, economists, sci-
entists (like bioengineers), many of whom could offer high-level ser-
vices to foreign clients (and those “new-rich” Cubans who are emerg-
ing), are not permitted to do so.  
 
In an evident effort to stimulate non-state enterprises without nurtur-
ing private capitalism, there are signs that more opportunities will be 
offered to cooperatives, even outside agriculture. It has been an-
nounced that experiments with “mid-size” non-state cooperatives in 
sectors ranging from food services and fisheries to transportation will 
begin by the end of 2012. Some of these will be converted state-run 
enterprises, and these co-ops will be given preference over private 
single-owner businesses. A budget support of 100 million USD will 
also be set aside in order to stimulate this sector.27 A very decisive 
question in political terms is whether these new cooperatives will be 
allowed to develop as really autonomous and people-controlled struc-
tures. A democratic cooperative movement in Cuba could be a very 
important building stone in a development towards more general lib-
eral democracy in the country. It is difficult to observe signs in that 
direction so far.  
                                                 
26  In Santiago de Cuba, practically all public transport in the city is now left to privately-
owned pre-revolutionary lorries in conspicuously good condition, adapted with sitting fa-
cilities (although quite crude) for passengers. At the same time, literally thousands of mo-
torcycle taxis are also providing a significant part of the urban transport during rush 
hours. In another eastern city, Holguín, most urban transport is provided by bicycle taxis 
and horse-drawn carriages.   
27  Announcement made by Cuba’s “economy czar,” Marino Murillo, at a session of Cuba’s 
Parliament in July, 2012 (according to a cable from Associated Press, dated Havana 23 
July 2012).  
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The pace of people receiving licenses for self-employment has appar-
ently exploded over the last year. At this time (October 2012), the 
number of licenses granted is 380,000, an increase of 236,000 since 
the 2010 decree was issued. But more than two thirds of those who 
received such licenses were previously unemployed (or in reality peo-
ple who exercised freelance work illegally), while 15% were retirees. 
Only 16% (38,000 workers) were individuals who actually left state 
employment.28 Thus, the absorption capacity of this alternative when 
it comes to new employment creation seems to have been quite mini-
mal. 
 
But the most recent figures indicate that the percentage of workers 
employed in non-state jobs actually increased substantially from 2010 
to 2011, from 16% to 22 % of the total workforce (1.1 million out of a 
total workforce of 5 million).29 Much of this increase is explained by 
formalization of previously illegal self-employment, by the “leasing 
out” of small state services (barber shops, cafeterias, transportation, 
etc.), and of course by the significant increase that we have described 
in non-state agriculture. In this way, it may be statistically correct that 
300,000 people were moved from the state to the non-state sector dur-
ing this period, but many of them were basically doing the same job.  
 
What we see in practice is that the heavy restrictions on private busi-
ness, in a situation where demand is booming, lead to the emergence 
of non-legal business practices. A typical case is a person I met in Ha-
vana who had accumulated a total of ten taxi licenses and had people 
working for him, or a construction entrepreneur who had been living 
for some years in Mexico and came back to set up a building rehabili-
tation business with a significant number of workers (very much 
needed in most Cuban cities and towns, particularly after the opening 
up of a real estate market). What is a pity is that only those who are 
tolerated at the margin of the law, often with a long history as bisneros 
(the “wheelers and dealers” of any heavily regulated economy with a 
large black market) are the ones who are growing as entrepreneurs, 
rather than the kind of entrepreneur Cuba really needs: what we may 
call “Schumpeterian entrepreneurs,” those who could build a sound 
private sector not least in industry and production, with real employ-
ment creation. Such a class, unfortunately, is not yet politically ac-
cepted and even less promoted in Cuba. And the potential for its 
emergence and rapid growth is there, only thinking of the potential for 
productive use of family remittances from the Cuban Diaspora, not 
least in Florida (easily amounting to 2 billion USD per year). But a 
recent survey-based analysis shows that restrictions from both the 
                                                 
28  Pavel Vidal and Omar Everleny Pérez (2012): Miradas a la economia cubana: El proceso 
de actualización, La Habana. 
29  Figures provided by Cuba’s National Office of Statistics, quoted by Associated Press in a 
cable from Havana dated 30 August 2012. 
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U.S. and Cuba seriously limits the employment creation potential of 
remittances, limiting the effect basically to economic survival: 
 
The findings show that remittances continue to play an important role in the eco-
nomic survival of Cubans, with money coming from the U.S. and other parts of 
the world. We find that an important proportion of recipients want to own a 
business and some already have established one. The businesses that remittance 
recipients have established or aspire to establish are geared toward the service 
sector and led by micro-enterprises aimed at achieving self-subsistence rather 
than wealth generation.30 
 
The legalization of property trade is probably already having im-
portant impacts: on the emergence of an investment capital market, on 
the expansion of domestic demand, on the creation of new entrepre-
neurial incentives (risks and benefits).  This may be an opportunity, 
but it also contains serious risks:  
 
The central challenge for the government now is to create a system of contracts 
and institutions to tap this potential increase in productivity, while avoiding 
predatory and corrupt practices. A corruption boom is a permanent threat to the 
transition to a mixed economy since the current Cuban power structure is filled 
with rent seeking opportunities and lacks supervisory capacity and transparen-
cy.31   
 
Another economic reform with potential political impact is the launch-
ing of a credit system, but so far it has been limited to non-convertible 
currency and it has not been very easy to access for small businesses. 
Most of the credit continues to go to state enterprises.32  
 
One of the obvious political motives behind all these restrictions on 
private business is the worry that more independent-minded social 
structures will emerge, and that the Communist Party thus will lose 
political and social hegemony. It was interesting to see how the organ-
izers of the May Day parade in Havana in 2012 made efforts to mobi-
lize a section of cuentapropista marchers. If business initiatives as 
such are being obstructed, this is even much more the case with any 
effort to organize independent unions or interest groups for the new 
economic actors. It will be highly interesting and indicative of the 
country’s democratic potential to see how such initiatives – which 
with high probability will emerge as differentiated interests grow – 
will be met by the government.  
                                                 
30  Manuel Orozco and Katrin Hansing (2011): “Remittance recipients and the present and 
future of micro-entrepreneurship activities in Cuba,” Cuba in Transition—Volume 21, p. 
302, 
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/orozcohansing.pdf. 
31  Arturo Lopez-Levy (2011): “Houses, used cars and markets: Change Cuban can believe 
in”, The Havana Note   
http://thehavananote.com/2011/11/houses_used_cars_and_markets_change_cubans_can_
believe 
32  Pavel Vidal Alejandro (2012): “Pasos hacia la bancarización del sector no estatal cu-
bano,” published in ASCE News, February 2012. 
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At the end of the day, this is a question of the Communist Party’s 
power monopoly. As Samuel Farber, a self-declared champion of 
”revolutionary democratic socialism from below,” points out: 
 
[But] there is also the question of political power, and the central bureaucracy is-
n't going to share power with newly minted capitalists unless they totally assimi-
late into the ruling bureaucracy. But this has also happened in China--you have 
capitalists joining the Communist Party and becoming a part of it.33 
 
He could have added that the same pattern is seen in Vietnam. Wheth-
er a similar trend will appear in Cuba is still impossible to predict – 
simply because we cannot yet speak about a capitalist class in Cuba. 
But it will be an important aspect to watch carefully. 
 
A very likely scenario – also when comparing to the rise of neo-
capitalism in China and Vietnam – is that Diaspora investments could 
play an important role in kick-starting a market economy in Cuba. 
There are increasingly strong signs that rich Cuban-Americans are 
getting ready to invest in Cuba, but many of them are concerned that 
also Cuban nationals be allowed to take part in common enterprise. 
One of the most vocal advocates of this vision is Carlos Saladrigas, an 
influential Cuban-American investor with strong links to the Catholic 
Church in Cuba: 
 
The Cuban entrepreneur in exile has a lot to contribute in future Cuba. We are 
part of that enormous human capital of the Fatherland. I know almost all big en-
trepreneurs in Miami […], I know well the interest they have in contributing 
their talent and their treasure to help a prospering and progressing Cuba… We 
also believe in the need to create a Creole, Cuban capital. We are worried about a 
Cuba where the capital once again becomes mostly foreign. After so many years 
struggling for sovereignty, it would be ironic to return to a Cuba dominated by 
foreign capital. … [I]t would be ethically inacceptable to allow [the Diaspora en-
trepreneurship] to invest in Cuba, as foreign investors, if the same opportunity is 
not offered to Cubans living in Cuba […] Many exile entrepreneurs will like to 
invest in Cuba in association with Cubans from the Island who know intimately 
the peculiarities of the Cuban market and the idiosyncrasy of contemporary Cu-
ba.34  
 
But so far, this window of opportunity does not seem to provoke much 
interest in Cuban power circles. It must have been highly frustrating 
for people like Saladrigas to observe the lukewarm reception from 
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez at a recent meeting in New York 
with a group of would-be Cuban emigrant investors. It is difficult to 
                                                 
33  Farber (2006), op. cit.  
34  Carlos Saladrigas, interviewed by Orlando Márquez (2011): “No es fácil cambiar, pero lo 
hice,” Palabra Nueva, La Habana, May. Even some leading figures of the most successful 
conservative Cuban-American families with leading economic roles in pre-Castro Cuba 
are now returning to Cuba to find out whether the ongoing reforms offer possibilities for 
investments in the country, perhaps afraid of “missing the train”: Paul L. Cejas (a former 
U.S. Ambassador and close friend of the Clinton family), and Alfonso Fanjul (whose fam-
ily was one of the major sugar industry entrepreneurs) both visited Cuba in April 2012.  
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avoid the interpretation that the development of small and medium 
entrepreneurship is of no real interest to the Cuban government, when 
the response they got from the Foreign Minister was that “Cuba is 
looking for investments of a magnitude that normally does not come 
from the emigration.” The government, he said, is chasing thousands 
of millions of dollars rather than some few hundred thousand.35 
 
This response may offer a significant sign regarding a crucial question 
for Cuba’s political future: whether this increasing co-investment op-
portunity offered by rich Diaspora Cubans will be dominated or mo-
nopolized by Cuban state, not least military corporations, or whether 
non-military Cuban entrepreneurs will be allowed to develop such 
links. Samuel Farber leaves no doubt as to what he predicts: 
 
A more likely scenario is that the heads of the Cuban army will welcome the in-
vestments of the Cuban-American capitalists with the clear understanding that 
the army will politically run the show. Of course, over the longer term, these two 
forces would tend to merge with each other. These army leaders will be in a po-
sition, as we indicated above, to make deals directly with the even bigger U.S. 
capitalists, without having to depend or need the Cuban-American capitalists as 
intermediaries, although many of the latter may feel encouraged to play that 
role.36 
The Role of Key Actors 
One way to try to understand the direction of political changes going 
on in Cuba in the wake of economic reforms is – as we have seen in 
other transition processes – to watch different key actor groups and 
their changing behavior. 
 
The first group to watch would obviously be the new generation of 
state and party leaders. Are there identifiable tendencies, factions, ide-
ological and political differences, or even more: is there a power 
struggle going on between such factions, preparing for the post-Castro 
era? The answer is simply that practically no such signs are visible 
either to external observers or even to party members and high-level 
officials outside of the absolute power elite (Politburo and Central 
Committee). Cuban top leaders are extremely tight-lipped and they 
maintain the appearance of absolute and monolithic unity, even in a 
situation where almost every aspect of Cuban society is under critical 
consideration.  
 
While there is a certain intellectual debate about socialist alternatives 
(see later), people with leading positions in the party and state institu-
tions hardly express any opinions or preferences. One can only specu-
                                                 
35  Quoted in ASCE Cuban Economic News Clippings Service, No. 541, dated 2/10/12. 
36  Farber (2006), op.cit. 
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late about the reason, assuming that there must be different opinions 
about all the fundamental decisions ahead for this country: with all the 
younger leaders kicked out of political positions over the years and 
particularly since Raúl Castro took over, nobody with survival in-
stincts is willing to stick out his or her neck and risk being the next 
victim of party purges. But even if this were the case, one is left to 
wonder whether the new generation of leaders who very soon will 
have to take over the reins from the revolution generation now in their 
80s, really have any strategic vision about the way ahead for this 
country. It is, for instance, very difficult to find out which younger 
party cadres at various levels, starting with the provincial first secre-
taries (10 out of 16 of these are also members of the Central Commit-
tee and thus probably are among the strongest candidates for future 
leadership roles), are drivers for or against economic and/or political 
reforms. 
 
A second important group of actors to watch very carefully is the mili-
tary, and particularly heads of the military corporations. Six out of 14 
members of the Politburo are high military officers or have a military-
technocratic background, adding to the three remaining historical 
leaders who also have military ranks (meaning that two thirds of the 
Politburo are military men). Among the eight members of the Presi-
dency of the Council of Ministers, so to say the inner Cabinet of the 
Cuban government, six are military and/or historic revolutionary lead-
ers (75%).37 Many recent cabinet reshuffles have led to top-level mili-
tary taking over key government positions. So there is no doubt about 
the increasingly dominant position held by the military institution – of 
course led by President Raúl Castro himself – in party and govern-
ment structures.  
 
But even more strategically important may be the dominant role 
played by military corporations in the key areas of the Cuban econo-
my, especially the most dynamic parts of it and those linked to foreign 
investments. There are two leading military conglomerates:  
 
 Cimex (Cuban Export-Import Corporation) is Cuba’s largest 
commercial corporation, with operations in finance, interna-
tional trade, tourism, domestic trade, real estate, security and 
many other sectors, said to have more than 80 companies and 
25,000 employees. Army Colonel Hector Oroza Busutin was 
appointed as Cimex’s CEO in 2011.38 
 Gaesa (Business Administration Group) controls the leading 
tourism company Gaviota (which is the Cuban counterpart of 
                                                 
37  The only exceptions being Ricardo Cabrisas Ruíz and Miguel Díaz-Canel. 
38  Information based on different articles from Reuter’s Havana bureau, and a private inter-
view with a former marketing director of Cimex, Emilio Morales, now residing in Miami. 
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some of the leading foreign hotel chains in the country); Al-
macenes Universal (which is in charge of the country’s free-
trade zones including the one being built in Mariel); and 
Agrotex (the leading military corporation in agriculture). The 
leader of Gaesa’s day-to-day operations is Raúl’s son-in-law, 
Major Luis Alberto Rodríguez López Callejas, who is also 
heading the important Section V of the Ministry of Defense, 
in charge of the Armed Forces’ economic activity. Rodríguez 
is by many seen as the Castro family’s personal representative 
in the military-economic web of institutions.39    
Leaders of these and other military corporations are clearly candidates 
to play a dominant economic as well as political role in post-Castro 
Cuba.  
 
It is interesting to note that two leading extractive industries nickel 
and oil – key sectors for Cuba’s economic future and in many coun-
tries a preferred source of rent-seeking for military officials – are so 
far apparently not controlled by the military corporations. 
 
The third group to watch in the government structures, although it is 
pretty difficult to personalize, is the state bureaucracy, which is ac-
cused by Raúl Castro himself of boycotting or slowing down many of 
the reform processes. Another way of seeing this is that there is a 
widespread practice of “civil disobedience” within the state bureau-
cracy. What is the basis of this resistance? Is it simply foot-dragging 
based on fear for change? Is it a consequence of the myriad of partly 
contradictory laws and regulations where the best protection for a bu-
reaucrat afraid of committing errors is to put up a lot of red tape? Or is 
it more ideologically inspired, perhaps paying allegiance to the most 
prominent enemy of the market economy, Fidel Castro himself? The 
latter thesis is maintained by Samuel Farber, himself a strong critic of 
market reforms, referring to this resistance as “neo-Fidelismo”:   
 
While neo-Fidelismo is going to be an important political current resisting the 
neoliberal trend in Cuban politics during a post-Communist transition, it will do 
so in the only way it knows how: in a bureaucratic, authoritarian and paternalist 
manner unable to tap the democratic roots of the popular resistance to capitalist 
neo-liberalism.40 
 
Outside the party and state apparatus, there are many actors whose 
importance we are only beginning to see:  
 
 The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, led by Cardenal Ortega, 
which is playing an active intermediary and dialogue role, crit-
                                                 
39  Same sources as quoted in previous note.  
40  Farber (2006), op.cit. 
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icized by some for being too friendly to Castro, but undoubted-
ly an important alternative voice in the Cuban society. One of 
the ambitions of the Catholic Church (also raised by the Pope 
during his 2012 visit to Cuba) is to be allowed to establish 
non-state education institutions. The first-ever non-state Mas-
ter program, in Business Administration, is now being initiated 
by Centro Cultural Padre Félix Varela in Havana. That may be 
an interesting beginning of a new trend. Around the country, 
the Catholic Church is running several business trainings for 
small entrepreneurs. 
 Some academics with relative autonomy, perhaps especially 
economists who have more legitimacy to debate reform re-
quirements than other social scientists, are acting within pro-
reform think tanks. 
 The emerging entrepreneurs, still quite invisible in public life. 
A special sub-group to watch here may be retired military of-
ficers, who seem to have relatively frequent access to start pri-
vate business of certain significance by Cuban standards. 
 What is referred to as NGOs, which in Cuba never have had 
real independence from state institutions (perhaps with a cer-
tain exception for church groups offering charity support, such 
as the Catholic Caritas).   
These groups constitute what some have called “a grey zone” in Cu-
ban society:  
 
a grey area has emerged where intellectuals and groups that promote citizen in-
terests without directly challenging the state’s power are tolerated. These efforts 
include women rights, opposition to racial discrimination, consumers’ rights, gay 
rights, protection against anti-religious discrimination, the environment, anti-
abortion groups, death penalty abolitionists, the right to freedom of movement, 
among many other non-overtly political groups that do not challenge the monop-
oly of power of the PCC but demand policies that address their concerns.41 
 
Some theoretical discussions are going on among a reduced group of 
intellectuals in magazines such as Temas, Espacio Laical and Palabra 
Nueva (the first linked to the Ministry of Culture, the last two to the 
Catholic Church), also reflected in letters to the three Cuban dailies, 
and in some websites such as www.kaosnelared.net. An interesting 
effort to identify three “principal positions or visions about Cuban so-
cialism” is represented by Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, where she dis-
tinguishes between a statist, an economistic and a self-management 
vision of “what is necessary to save the Cuban socialist project.”42 The 
statist alternative is basically the status quo “centralized state with a 
vertical structure”; the economistic approach is equivalent to “market 
                                                 
41  Arturo López Levy (2011), op.cit., pp. 384-385. 
42  Camila Piñeiro Harnecker (2012): “Visiones sobre el socialismo que guían los cambios 
actuales en Cuba,” Revista Temas, April-June 2012, No. 70 
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socialism” following the Chinese and Vietnamese model; whereas 
self-management ideas are more utopian but perhaps to a certain ex-
tent practically applicable through cooperative ideas. No liberal dem-
ocratic alternative with promotion of personal freedoms is represented 
in these approaches, but they are to a certain extent present in the de-
bates taking place within the Catholic magazines. 
 
These debates generally stay within the party’s tolerance zone, but 
some discussants may be moving towards positions of open confronta-
tion. In this latter zone, we already find dozens of dissenter groups, 
which generally attract much more attention internationally than 
among Cubans, partly because they have very limited means to com-
municate within Cuba. The best  known among these – who are all 
considered by the Cuban Government as pawns of the U.S.  govern-
ment -- are the Ladies in White, consisting of wives and mothers of 
previous political prisoners; the Cuban Human Rights and National 
Reconciliation Commission led by Elizardo Sánchez; and the Varela 
project, headed by Oswaldo Payá until he was killed in a car accident 
in July 2012.  
 
Probably much more important than these groups are the bloggers and 
other actors in new social media, and the independent journalists. Alt-
hough Cuba is among the countries in the world with most restrictions 
against the internet,43 the government and the security police find it 
very hard to stop their activities. It is difficult to judge how far they 
reach inside the Cuban society, but they probably have a significant 
audience among young people, mostly academics: 
 
Thanks to the new technologies for digital reproduction [in Cuba the memory 
sticks are clearly the most used tool in the absence of general internet access – 
comment added by the author] [civil society actors] have managed to articulate 
debate among certain public spheres. Via electronic mail and Internet, thousands 
of citizens, principally in the cities, have had access to political proposals and 
debates on the national reality, at the margin of the official circuits for the circu-
lation of ideas. This mixture of bulletins, blogs, websites, journals, video repro-
duction platforms, simple e-mails among groups of friends, and so on, consti-
tutes a real political laboratory where the future of Cuba is being cooked.44   
 
Admittedly, the heavy internet restrictions in Cuba represent an effec-
tive brake on the proliferation of new social media, compared to al-
most any other country in the world. The security services have evi-
dently decided to do their utmost to avoid a repetition of events like 
the Arab Spring where the social media played a crucial role. Also, 
                                                 
43  On the so-called “Press Freedom Index” elaborated by the organization Reporters Without 
Borders, Cuba rates 167 out of 179 countries (but with a score well ahead that of both Vi-
etnam and China). The same organization also publishes a list of “internet enemies,” 
where Cuba appears as one of 12 countries (also Vietnam and China among them).  
44  Lenier González, roundtable discussion, in Espacio Laical, at  
www.espaciolaical.org/contens/esp/sd_160.pdf.  
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according to university professors, political apathy and a complete 
lack of ideological knowledge and debate seem to dominate among 
Cuban university students.45 It is therefore questionable how easy it 
would be to mobilize popular upheavals among young people in Cuba, 
in spite of the objective conditions that might exist due to the wide-
spread complaints generally expressed by young Cubans about their 
life prospects.  
 
One of the few arenas where young people can express and exchange 
frustrations and protest publicly is through music. The subcultures of 
hip-hop, rap and particularly Raggaeton are attracting tremendous in-
terest among Cuban youth, and the texts are often extremely critical 
and directly confrontational, condemning and insulting about the Cu-
ban system and its leaders, while also cheering capitalist and consum-
erism values. This subculture evidently represents a complicated chal-
lenge, but is generally tolerated although records are mostly produced 
and circulated unofficially (bicycle taxis being one of the sales outlets 
in Havana, for instance). The big question is whether this culture may 
lead young people into protest, social mobilization of some kind; 
whether it is a safety valve or a source of potential political mobiliza-
tion. It is interesting to note that even the Communist Youth League 
(UJC) tries to attract people by organizing Raggaeton events, in a 
tough balancing act between staying in touch with youth trends and 
inspiring anti-regime sentiments. The Cuban sociologist Nora Gámez, 
who recently defended her PhD dissertation about this phenomenon, 
discusses whether this music is “a rehearsal of politics’ [or] a form of 
politics itself”; “a painful reminder […] of the increasing gap between 
emergent values rooted in everyday life experience and socialist ide-
ology”:  
 
At the deepest level, though, Raggaeton constitutes a challenge for the dominant 
ideology […] in which the underclass has managed to break into the cultural 
sphere without permission […] [R]aggaeton poses a challenge to the dominant 
ideology and its symbolic control over the construction of reality, over the con-
struction of identities and the “right”, “correct” values in an allegedly socialist 
society […] What Raggaeton reveals dramatically is what the state precisely 
wants to conceal, that in everyday life, socialist values have lost considerable 
space and that people have started to adjust their mentalities to the kind of post-
socialist economy we have had for the past two decades.46   
 
Crack-down on dissent is increasing in Cuba, although Amnesty In-
ternational claimed in October 2012 – after the release of the 75 dissi-
                                                 
45  This observation is based on many conversations with university professors and other 
intellectuals, generally belonging to a politicized generation of intellectuals, often highly 
frustrated with the general apathy and lack of basic intellectual curiosity among the pre-
sent generation of students 
46  Nora Gámez Torres (2012): “Hearing the Change: Raggaeton and Emergent Values in 
Contemporary Cuba,” Latin American Music Review, Fall/Winter 2012 ,Volume 33, 
Number 2. (A shorter version in Spanish appeared in Revista Temas, No. 68 / 2011.) 
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dents convicted in 2003 in what became known as “The Black Spring” 
– that there are no political prisoners in Cuba.47 The pattern is now 
one of constant intimidation, bullying and short-term detentions. It is 
difficult to forecast how much tolerance there would be if the quite 
harmless protest and dissent that exists now turns into a more threat-
ening confrontation, which quite likely could occur as more pluralist 
social structures and socio-economic differentiation emerge and social 
media become more generally available. This will particularly be the 
case in the post-Castro era, with the almost certain reduction in sup-
port and legitimacy this would imply – partly already seen with the 
transition from Fidel to Raúl, although Fidel is still around. If we use 
China as an example, on average there are reportedly 500 strikes, riots 
and confrontations with the police every day. With a population about 
1% of China’s, this would represent 5 such confrontations daily in 
Cuba. That would be a really tough challenge to handle, and there 
would be an increasing dilemma between losing the political control 
and take very tough security measures which might risk propelling the 
confrontation and international protest even more. It is probably far 
more difficult to control such contradictions in Cuba than in culturally 
more collective and closed societies like China and Vietnam.    
The New International Context 
It is impossible to discuss the political prospects of Cuba without tak-
ing the international context into consideration. Cuba has always been 
dependent on foreign powers: Spain during the colonial era, the U.S. 
during the first 60 years of the 20
th
 century, and the USSR since the 
revolution until the demise of the Soviet superpower. During the deep 
crisis of the 1990s, following the fall of its socialist benefactor, revo-
lutionary Cuba saw itself obliged to take its first turn towards the capi-
talist world: direct foreign investments had been legalized already in 
1988 – particularly in the tourism sector – largely as a consequence of 
Gorbachev’s perestoika policy signaling reduced subsidies to the Cu-
ban economy, cuentapropismo, agricultural markets and the circula-
tion of the U.S. dollar were legalized (1992-94).48 When no external 
supporter was at hand, Hugo Chávez came to power in Venezuela and 
                                                 
47  Cuba is number 7 on the list of prisoners per capita in the world (510 per 100,000 inhabit-
ants), a list headed by the US (730). Russia has about the same index as Cuba, while Chi-
na and Vietnam have much lower figures (see International Centre for Prison Studies, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/). 
48  The consequences of the disappearance of the USSR were dramatic for Cuba: between 
1989 and 1993, Cuba’s exports and imports were reduced by 75-80%, gross investments 
by 60%, and GDP by 35%. While sugar (mostly being sold to the USSR) represented 
more than 90% of export revenue in 1990, tourism (mostly from Western Europe and 
Canada) had become the number one export earner (45%) in 2000, while health services 
(mostly to Venezuela) had the same position in 2006 (with sugar and tourism each repre-
senting about 25%).  See Jorge Mario Sánchez-Egozcue and Juan Triana Cordoví (2010): 
“Panorama de la economía, transformaciones en curso y retos perspectivos,” in Omar 
Everleny Pérez Villanueva (ed): Ciencuenta años de la economía cubana, Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, p. 83-152, particularly figures 1 and 4. 
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soon offered Cuba a new lifeline in terms of oil deliveries and other 
crucial support in exchange for medical and other social services. It 
was, of course, a great relief for Cuba that Chávez was comfortably 
re-elected for another six-year term in October 2012, but his health 
situation is still a factor of uncertainty for Cuba, since there is really 
nobody else to fill his shoes. In case he cannot fulfill his term, the 
Venezuelan constitution requires fresh elections, and the opinion polls 
prior to the 2012 elections indicated that Chávez was the only PSUV 
candidate that would have beaten the opposition.  
 
Several new elements of Cuba’s external relations will be of relevance 
for the direction of the Cuban reform process. Perhaps most important, 
Latin America has taken almost a U-turn to the left during the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century, providing Cuba with dramatically friendlier 
regional relations, ranging from direct partnership through the ALBA 
alliance (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some smaller 
Caribbean nations), significant political and economic ties to countries 
like Brazil and Argentina, and also improved relations with the rest of 
the continent. The other side of the same coin is that U.S. influence in 
Latin America has fallen drastically, leading to the unanimous OAS 
vote in 2009 to repeal the nearly half-century ban on Cuban member-
ship in the regional organization.49 The U.S. is now the only country 
in the western hemisphere without diplomatic relations with Cuba, and 
several new regional organizations excluding the U.S. but including 
Cuba have emerged, with CELAC (the Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States) as a possible substitute for the OAS: so to say 
an “OAS without the U.S.” 
 
The political economy of present-day Latin America offers a very in-
teresting context for the economic reforms in Cuba: market economy 
with increasing state intervention and the application of Keynesian 
regulatory and anti-cyclical policies. Politically, Latin America is ba-
sically ruled by democratic and popularly elected governments. This is 
a regional context within which Cuba may -- much easier than ever 
since the revolution -- find an echo for economic and even political 
transformations, without giving up on its basic revolutionary visions. 
 
Relations with the U.S. have not changed dramatically although Presi-
dent Obama has eased some of the embargo restrictions. With the re-
election of Barack Obama for a second term, we will at least avoid 
another worsening of relations which a Romney administration might 
have led to. But even if President Obama personally might have want-
ed to repeal the Helms-Burton law – which he actually expressed dur-
ing his Senate election campaign in 2004 – he has no power to do so 
given the composition of Congress. A certain rapprochement with di-
                                                 
49  But Cuba has so far expressed no interest in rejoining the OAS. 
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rect consequences for the role of the Cuban-American Diaspora dur-
ing the next four years should however not be completely ruled out.50 
Full political normalization with the EU will also be postponed after 
the 2012 change of government in Spain, while the majority of EU 
countries remain in the center-right camp. But this may be more than 
outweighed by the rapidly increasing role of China, Russia and the 
other BRICS (not least Brazil) in world politics and markets in general 
and in their interest in Cuba in particular. 
 
Another recent international factor must also be taken into considera-
tion: the “Arab Spring” in 2011.  The following statement from a 
prominent Egyptian scholar, making comparisons to the 1848 events 
in Europe, may have been representative of the optimism in liberal 
Arabic circles as the events were unfolding: 
 
It was at that time in Europe that peoples became politicised and started to play a 
role in politics, paving the way for great change. That is what is now happening 
in the Arab world. Thanks to modern technologies, mobilisation opportunities 
today are greater and more efficient. That is why things are moving faster in the 
21
st
 century than they did in the 19
th
, and why change will not take as long as it 
did back then in Europe.51 
 
Recent events, not least in Yemen and Syria, may indicate that there is 
all reason to be cautious about forecasting the rapid establishment of 
stable democracies in this part of the world, and that things may even 
move in a seriously worse direction.  
 
The sensational sequence of events during the “Arab Spring”52 obvi-
ously also led to speculation whether something similar might happen 
in Cuba. The veteran news correspondent in Havana, Marc Frank, 
listed ten reasons why such comparison is rather irrelevant, among 
them the limited internet and satellite TV penetration, completely dif-
ferent demographics, the level of health and education, much less ap-
parent police brutality, no developed business class, and finally two 
very important factors: “you are allowed to have sex and party”; and 
                                                 
50  A dramatic shift is underway with the Cuban-American vote in Florida, which has histori-
cally been controlled by anti-Castro, pro-embargo Republican politicians, also pushing 
Democratic candidates to take staunch anti-Castro positions with the purpose of winning 
this key swing state. Although exact figures are debated, exit polls of the 2012 presiden-
tial elections suggest that Obama was close to matching the votes for Romney in this elec-
toral group, compared to obtaining only 35% in 2008 and Gore achieving a poor 25% 
support in 2000. Among younger Cuban-Americans, either those born in the US or those 
arriving over the last 20 years, Obama seems to have obtained a comfortable majority, as-
sumingly in recognition for his easing of restrictions on travel and family remittances. 
These trends, one could speculate, may ultimately lead future Democratic candidates to 
abolish their confrontational policies towards Cuba. 
51  Gamad Abdalgawad Soltan, Director of the Al-Ahram-Centre for Political and Strategic 
Studies in Cairo, in Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 July 2011. 
52  The following reference offers a good oversight of the Arab Spring phenomenon: Marc 
Lynch, Susan B. Glasser, Blake Hounshell (eds) (2011): “Revolution in the Arab World: 
Tunisia, Egypt, and the Unmaking of an Era.” A Special Report from Foreign Policy, 
Washington. 
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“the leaders are not stealing the oil wealth and fooling around at Euro-
pean casinos.”53 
 
Actually, the most important impact of the Arab Spring in Cuba so far 
has probably been the increased nervousness of the security system 
when it comes to the dangers of letting loose internet and social me-
dia, with the consequent intensification of clamp-down on bloggers 
and opposition groups. To a certain extent this nervousness may be 
shared by significant portions of the Cuban population: television im-
ages of recent chaos in many Arab nations are hardly an incentive to 
initiate a similar social experiment. The stability that Cubans after all 
are enjoying is probably preferred to the fears of heading towards a 
failed state.  
 
If we add to this the dimensions of the financial crisis in the center of 
the capitalist world – including the two countries where the largest 
number of emigrant Cubans are living (the U.S. and Spain), many Cu-
bans may even be asking themselves whether Fidel in the end will be 
proven rights: that capitalism has no future, or at least that “authoritar-
ian capitalism” (or “socialist market economy”) as practiced in China 
and Vietnam could be a better alternative.    
 
In this new world order, Cuba can see that many of its partners take 
relatively little interest in some of the liberal-democratic ideals that 
were believed to become universal after the fall of the Soviet system. 
One thing is that two role models like China and Vietnam have very 
similar political systems to that of Cuba, and that they for the time be-
ing are enjoying much more economic success than most liberal mar-
ket economies. As we have seen, Russia and many of the former Sovi-
et-allied countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia seem to be 
moving in a more authoritarian direction. And even in Latin America, 
many of the democratically-elected leftist governments (not least the 
ALBA countries, Cuba’s closest allies in the western hemisphere) are 
being criticized for authoritarian tendencies when it comes to, e.g., 
press freedom and the autonomy of the judiciary. It is quite illustrative 
that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and even the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, institutions that were funda-
mental in the defense of movements bringing the present governments 
to power, are now increasingly questioned by many of the same gov-
ernments as the Commission brings issues against them (even includ-
ing Brazil, after the Commission ordered the halt of a gigantic dam 
construction due to its expected negative effects on the environment 
and the indigenous population). What this means in practice is that 
that the democratic-authoritarian dichotomy simply becomes more 
                                                 
53  Marc Frank (2011): “Notes on the current situation in Cuba,” Cuba in Transition—
Volume 21,   www.ascecuba.org). 
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blurred. Cuba – when looking for its own development path – can find 
many role models both on its own continent and elsewhere with rela-
tively democratic systems, but with significant restrictions in civil and 
political rights.  
 
The implications of these new international context factors will have 
to be taken into consideration when analyzing economic and political 
transition scenarios in Cuba, bearing in mind what Linz & Stepan 
(op.cit.) refer to as diffusion or zeitgeist, that is, contemporary spirits 
or trends in countries with similar cultural characteristics or with lev-
erage on the Cuban reality. Given Cuba’s socio-cultural heritage and 
the success of capitalist democracy in many Latin American countries 
such as Brazil, will this  diffusion effect after all be different in the 
case of Cuba from what Gainsborough (op.cit.) describes as the au-
thoritarian regional factors impacting on the transition in Vietnam? 
Or, perhaps more probable, will neo-authoritarian trends in many parts 
of the world decisively rule out a liberal market model in Cuba for the 
foreseeable future? 
Transformation Scenarios 
Based on the empirical elements outlined above, this study will pro-
pose three basic scenarios, across which the ongoing Cuban transfor-
mation will be moving, particularly in its post-Castro era (see Figure 
2).  
In the present Cuban socio-economic context, there are four main 
conditioning elements for economic-political transformation: the mas-
sive need for employment-generating new industry and business; a 
similarly massive need for increased food production; a great potential 
for a Cuban oil economy; and international conditions dominated by 
friendly and democratic and “Keynesian” Latin American neighbors, 
closer links to the BRICS countries, and a continued U.S. embargo 
(although with some possible easing of relations).  Each of these con-
ditioning factors will have decisive implications for alternative evolu-
tion trends, with very different consequences for the political out-
come. We distinguish here between three scenarios: 
 
(1) A social-democratic market transition, with gradual introduction of 
civil political rights, multi-party system and elected governments;  
 
(2) A mixed economy with significant authoritarian withdrawal but 
with maintenance of the one-party system (a variant of the Vietnamese 
model, but perhaps with more freedoms); and    
 
(3) Neo-authoritarian military-dominated state capitalism, with the 
military and other technocrats taking economic and political control, 
implying dangers of cronyism, corruption, oligarchic concentration of 
economic and political power. 
 
If the new market economy opens a space for SMEs and private entre-
preneurs, and if the production crisis in agriculture gives way to a 
family-farm model combined with strong democratic cooperative el-
ements and access to markets and agro-industrial development, this 
will clearly stimulate pluralistic and non-authoritarian political-
economic structures in the direction of scenarios (1) or (2). The more 
space there is for civil society organizations and voice, the better the 
chance for approaching scenario (1) rather than (2). However, if the 
space for private entrepreneurship remains as narrow as now or is 
closed, and the new economy is dominated by military-owned compa-
nies and/or an emerging state and party technocracy with growing oli-
garchic characteristics, more authoritarian trends will be strengthened. 
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The direction of diaspora investments may be a significant factor in 
determining which of these trends will gain the upper hand.  
 
The oil sector, which probably will become a significant new factor in 
Cuba’s economy some years from now when offshore production gets 
underway54, will also offer diametrically opposite development poten-
tials. A rent-seeking model, seen in so many other oil-producing coun-
tries, will definitely be of no help to avoid authoritarian structures in 
the future. Alternatively, if there is a real will to manage oil revenues 
in a transparent and accountable way for real development purposes, 
in order to avoid the “petroleum curse” seen in so many other cases, 
this could be a turning point in Cuba’s economic as well as political 
development. We have not discussed the alternative petroleum policy 
strategies in this paper, but they will be of considerable importance for 
the political outcome of the ongoing transformations. 
 
And finally, international conditions will have an impact. The present 
regional context in Latin America gives Cuba more options for a so-
cially responsible market economy than ever before, perhaps with 
Brazil as the potentially dominant partner. The other BRICS countries, 
particularly China and Russia, offer good economic partnership but 
not with much potential for pro-democratic influence. And a continua-
tion of the U.S. embargo (or blockade as the Cubans call it) will defi-
nitely not help Cuba in a democratic market direction. 
 
                                                 
54  This prognosis is still valid in spite of the so far unsuccessful offshore exploration drilling 
during 2012, resulting in three dry holes and the Platform Scarabeo 9 leaving Cuban wa-
ters in November 2012 (cubaencuentro, 2/11/2012). Cuban and US geological studies co-
incide in prospecting that considerable petroleum resources will be found north of Cuba, 
although the Cuban data are more optimistic than the US (realistically leading Cuba to 
become self-sufficient in oil, but hardly becoming a net oil exporter in the foreseeable fu-
ture). As a comparison, it took more than 30 dry holes to be explored in the North Sea be-
fore the actual oil production was started. Russian and Venezuelan companies are now 
expected to be in charge of the next phase in Cuban offshore exploration drilling. 
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Figure 2:  Cuban Transformation trends and scenarios 
         Existing conditions/potentials    Potential evolutions        Scenarios 
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